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Electoral Certainty and Policy Uncertainty in Authoritarian Regimes:
Russian Elites providing a Test Case
Introduction
Among political science scholars, there has always been an assumption that uncertainty is
a prevalently essential factor to impact the stability and continuity of many authoritarian regimes
if not all authoritarian dynasties. As Rivera confirmed, “even for elites holding office in fully
consolidated regimes, uncertainty about electoral outcomes is low but not nil” (Rivera 4). The
frequent appearance of different levels of uncertainty among authoritarian countries worldwide,
ranging from complete certainty to complete uncertainty, is a noticeable evidence that
uncertainty plays a key role in the political governance system of such nations. Electoral
outcomes and public policies are the two specific areas that demonstrate the most extreme
uncertainty (or certainty) levels because these two sectors directly affect the incumbency of
current authoritarian leaders, which significantly impacts national political stability and the
ability of that authoritarian regime to maintain durability and continuity.
While a significant amount of existing literature attempts to confirm the assumption that
uncertainty exists and persists in authoritarian-governed societies, rarely has any research
investigated and tested how political uncertainty unravels in detailed political contexts.
Specifically, minimal research has been done on the specific levels of uncertainty applied to
electoral outcome and public policies. As Bernhard, Edgell, and Lindberg have stated,
“authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure
in power” (Bernhard et al. 465). This means many authoritarian politicians are or have been
attempting to institutionalize electoral certainty, or that political certainty in authoritarian
regimes is increasing over time. Logically, with such abilities to manipulate institutions for
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self-benefiting purposes, politicians are likely to have overwhelming power in the policy-making
process. Because of such overwhelming power over policies, it would be reasonable to
hypothesize that policy outcomes would be uncertain as they are dependent on specific
politicians and their benefits.
In this paper, I will test two hypotheses using the data on perceptions of Russian elites in
the aforementioned matters. First, I explore the established relationship between authoritarianism
and uncertainty, especially from a comparative perspective with case-studies from authoritarian
countries around the world. Second, I explore the case of both electoral and policy (un)certainty
in Russia to explain why it is reasonable to use Russia as an empirical case to test my
hypotheses. Followed by the literature review section, I will present the data analysis on
uncertainty in electoral and policy outcomes, especially by looking at predictive perceptions
rather than past results (i.e. perceptions of political succession and stability in the future). My
conclusion will demonstrate whether the data confirms my hypotheses and how my study
contributes to the current literature resources on this topic.
Literature Review
Authoritarianism and uncertainty
Scholars in the field have long debated the idea of authoritarianism. In “Authoritarian
Regimes,” Gabriela Vaillant gives a thorough definition of authoritarianism: “authoritarianism
can be understood both as a political regime and an ideological construct [...] As a political
regime, authoritarianism can be defined as a form of government that monopolizes authority over
the state without guaranteeing political pluralism or defense of civil liberties and with little or no
accountability to the population. In order to enforce exclusive claim over power, authoritarian
regimes revert to unconstitutional or illegitimate means such as the use of force, censorship, or
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infusion of fear…” (Vaillant 1). Meanwhile, Marlies Garsius defines “authoritarian practices as
patterns of action that sabotage accountability to people over whom a political actor exerts
control, or their representatives, by means of secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice […]
authoritarian practices primarily constitute a threat to democratic processes, while illiberal
practices are primarily a human rights problem” (Garsius 517). In sum, even when defined as a
political regime, a social construct, or a perspective practice, authoritarianism has the same
characteristics: undemocratic, suppressive, and hierarchical.
Uncertainty, or specifically political uncertainty, in authoritarian regimes stem from such
characteristics. Political uncertainty can imply multiple factors involving but not limited to: local
politics (electoral results, campaigning, etc.), public policy-making process (policy issuance,
policy revisions, and detailed implementations), or political future of a country. In the book “The
Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism,” Andreas
Schedler studied two specific types of authoritarian political uncertainty: “institutional
uncertainty” and “informational uncertainty” (Schedler 2). Both of these contribute to both
“adaptive responses” and “creative responses” from authoritarian leaders that often are
manipulations of the democratic rule, subverting to the basic characteristics of authoritarianism
as mentioned above (Schedler 22). With the existing in-depth literature on the relationship of
uncertainty and authoritarianism, it is logical that we conclude there exists a significant level of
uncertainty within each authoritarian regime. While the theoretical framework is firmly set, it is
the empirical investigation that is missing from the current resources to demonstrate the
appearance of uncertainty in two detailed and most important sectors of politics: electoral and
policy outcomes.
Comparative literature on uncertainty in authoritarian regimes
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On the other hand, many scholars have conducted research on unique case-studies of
electoral outcome and policy revisions in specific authoritarian countries. Political researchers
have compiled cases of authoritarian regimes all over the world including: North Korea, Egypt,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Cuba, Vietnam, etc. Almost all of these countries have witnessed “absurd
electoral results” (Katz, The Washington Post). As reported in the same article, Kazakhstani
President Nursultan Nazarbayev won a fifth term in 2015, taking about 98 percent of the vote in
an election with a turnout around 95 percent. The Egyptian president appointed his own military
successor in 2014. North-Korean Kim Jong Un got 100 percent of the vote in 2014 (Katz, The
Washington Post). In the case of Vietnam, the political system creates a condition for electoral
certainty because the political system scouts for people to be on the ballot and leaves the
uncertainty within this guaranteed ballot, allowing a certain level of democracy at the grass-root
level by letting the people vote for representatives at the very low levels (Lewis, TIME). These
examples surely ascertain a pattern of electoral certainty in authoritarian regimes.
One of the most popular ways for authoritarian incumbents to hold onto power is to
manipulate the governance system and local institutions (Bernhard et al. 467). In authoritarian
regimes, policy is often top-down managed or controlled because the authoritarian political
system has the overwhelming power in deciding whether a policy would be issued, amended, or
altered. Authoritarian politicians often utilize a “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002) to rig
existing institution in order to suit their purposes. This helps create “an uneven playing field” in
not only electoral outcome in authoritarian regimes but also in the manipulation and distribution
of power among authoritarian incumbents (Levitsky and Way 8). Yet, no empirical evidence has
been shown to demonstrate how authoritarian leaders are changing institutions to suit their
purposes, and in which process increasing policy uncertainty. Here, the uncertainty is caused
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because policy decisions are, again, dependent on only certain influential individuals with
centralizing power over the rest of the administrative system.
Uncertainty in Russia
Russia provides the perfect case study for an empirical study because (1) its electoral
track record for the past two decades has been strikingly autocratic and (2) empirical data are
available for empirical analysis. Ever since his first official election on March 26, 2000, Vladimir
Putin has been both the president and the most influential authoritarian politician in Russia.
There have been multiple times at which Putin has manipulated the existing institutions
(including the Russian Constitution, legislatures, and other official orders) in order to keep hold
of his position and his overwhelming power. Most noticeably, in July 2020, Vladimir Putin’s
Constitutional Reform proposal was passed overwhelmingly and Putin will be able to hold office
for two more terms. This leaves many questions unanswered about the level of political
uncertainty in this country, which makes it a perfect test case for our study. More importantly,
authoritarian regimes often do not allow for political-information transparency due to their
efforts in reducing “informational uncertainty” (Schedler 38). Therefore, the Survey of Russian
Elites provide the perfect dataset to test out hypotheses that cannot be tested in other
authoritarian regimes.
Data Sources
This research paper analyzes statistics from the Survey of Russian Elites, collected in the
period of 2016 – 2020 (Rivera and Zimmerman 2016 – 2020). The main purpose of studying the
data is to determine whether there exist electoral certainty and policy-outcome uncertainty in
authoritarian regimes by looking at elite perceptions of the Russian political context and future as
well as elites’ impacts on Russian foreign policies. The dataset provides information on elite
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perceptions of various elements related to Russian politics and specifically, Russian foreign
policy (as this was the initial purpose of the survey). The data is observed on the individual level
(individual Russian elites). The dataset is quantitative. There are 245 observations and 314
variables on record. There was no data cleaning necessary. I have run multiple frequency tables
as well as cross-tabulation to conclude whether there is uncertainty in the two specific sectors
mentioned above, as well as several cross-tabulation to suggest reasonable explanations to such
uncertainties. The data confirms both of my hypotheses and suggest that whether an elite belongs
to a certain group would affect their perception on political uncertainty (both in electoral results
and public policy). The next section will explain more thoroughly why I came to my conclusion.
Certainty in Electoral Outcome
In 2020, Russian elites were asked whether they think that Russian political stability has
increased over the last two decades. According to Figure 1, the majority of Russian elites
(around 62%) believes that Russian political stability has increased over the years, started when
Putin took power. The political stability is likely to be caused by the fact that over the last two
decades, electoral outcome has not changed: Vladimir Putin has consistently been the most
influential person to Russian politics. In exploring whether elites think that electoral certainty is
the cause of political stability both in the past and in the future (which means that there exists
significant electoral certainty in authoritarian regimes and such certainty is increasing over time),
I explore multiple questions in the 2020 Survey of Russian Elites and compare the results to the
2016 survey if there is available data.
According to Figure 2, over time, more and more Russian elites believe that the most
appropriate political system for Russia is Western-type democracy or the current political system
(around 40% of elites in 2016, and 44% in 2020). And since elites perceive that such a
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democracy is the best option for the political future of Russia, they have logical doubts over
political forces or politically influential individuals who can likely prevent the development of a
new, proper Russian democracy. Figure 3 illustrates vividly such worry by showing that elites
are very negative about a democratic future for Russian politics. In 2016, there was already 59%
of elites who believed that it was either unlikely or very unlikely that another party would come
to power. In 2020, this number rises to 81%, meaning that among elites exists an even stronger
belief that no other Russian political party independent of United Russia will be able to take
control of the state. This means, in the next decade, electoral results will not witness uncertainty
or if there is, the uncertainty will be very minimal; the electoral outcome will be almost perfectly
predictable and controlled so that United Russia will remain in power. The certainty in electoral
outcome is not limited to only party-level but has been brought to an individual level, examined
by Vladimir Putin’s case.
Figure 4 suggests that in 2016, Russian elites expected Putin’s influences to diminish by
2024 as stated in the Russian Constitution. This should be the expected case but for the passing
of the Constitution Reform proposal by Putin in 2020. The event is one of the signal that
electoral certainty has now been institutionalized. The amendment allows Putin to be in office for
two more consecutive six-year terms, meaning that for the next decade, the Presidential electoral
outcome in Russia will not observe any uncertainty. As of right now, Russian elites are still
scattered in predictive opinions about the next Russian political generation. Perhaps the situation
that will most likely happen, according to 38% of the elites in Figure 4, is that somewhere
between the years 2025 and 2030, Putin will leave his “post” as the most influential person in
Russia and another politician (likely of his succession and will be within the same party) will
take over this “position”. This brings to attention a significantly alarming reality of electoral
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certainty that is now institutionalized, which accords to existing literature of the field. Yet, an
interesting finding is that in 2016, the majority of elites (61% of respondents) expects that Putin
will sustain his post as President by predicting that it is unlikely for another person to replace
him. Meanwhile, as the Constitutional Reform Proposal was revealed to the public in 2020, an
increased percentage of 47% of Russian elites predict that in the next decade, someone else will
replace Putin as President as shown in Figure 5. This means that even though the people have
voted for the Constitutional Reform, they expect that the electoral certainty will be put to an end
in the next decade and that these two consecutive terms will be Putin’s last.
The data that I have analyzed above demonstrate that Russian elites have quite a clear
perception that (1) there exists electoral certainty in the case of Russia and (2) electoral certainty
is taking the form of either political succession or electoral-certainty institutionalization.
Statistics in Figure 6 strongly supports that Russian politics will witness political succession at
least in the generations of Putin and after Putin. According to Figure 6 in which elites were asked
if there is a threat of political succession in Russia, over 62% of elites rate the danger of
succession at level 3 or higher. This means, there exist at least a medium-level danger and at
times utmost danger of political succession in Russia. This empirical evidence about the future of
Russian politics assures the aforementioned argument that electoral certainty is showing in the
form of political succession. For this particular question, I added a Chi-square Test with an
attempt to observe whether there is a statistical significant relationship between being a
party-member and the individual belief that there is political succession. According to Table 1,
most of the people who are not party-members think that there is a danger of political succession
and most party-members think that there is little to no danger of political succession. The
relationship is statistically significant, meaning that most independent elites think that there is a
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danger of Russia turning into a full autocratic authoritarian, while in-party elites believe that the
current system is closer to a democratic one.
Figure 7, on the other hand, illustrate that when asked what the main goal for the 2020
Constitutional Reform is, the option that most elites (37%) opt for is that the main goal is “Putin
retaining power after his current presidency” (Survey of Russian Elites). Even though this is not
concrete evidence, the fact that a majority of Russian elites confirm this option as their
perception of the main goal of the 2020 Constitutional Reform, it is worth considering that there
is a sign of electoral-certainty institutionalization.
Looking into the future of Russia, especially with Putin surely in office for the next ten
years, the reasonable inquiry for elites is what happens after the Putin presidency. For now, from
the 2020 survey, Russian elites still hold very different opinions about how Putin will distribute
his power after leaving his post. The most likely option according to Russian elites right now
(with 22.4% respondents believing that Putin will follow this agenda) is that Putin will transfer
all of his power to a trustful successor. This option is also the most logical according to the
findings that I have made throughout this report. The existence of electoral certainty when
combined with Putin’s ability to appoint a successor would eventually create an autocratic
Russia.
Uncertainty in Policy Outcome
When authoritarian leaders can guarantee electoral outcomes, it would not be difficult for
them to manipulate policies to benefit their own purposes. The Survey of Russian Elites explore
policies related to foreign affairs, which gives us an opportunity to test out whether such policies
are decided in an uncertain manner. The hypothesis that I attempt to test out is that policy
outcome would be fully dependent on who the incumbent responsible for that policy area is.
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According to Figure 9, in 2016, 62% of elites perceived that elites have no effect overall
on foreign policies. This figure drops to 56% in 2020, yet this is still the majority opinion. In
2020, around 37% of elites think that as a whole, they have some influences over foreign
policies. In Figure 10, elites were asked whether they think that they have personal influences on
Russian foreign policies. The majority of elites do not think they have personal impact on foreign
policies in Russia, but it might be a result of the choice in sampling of the survey as elites chosen
might not work in fields related to foreign policies. Yet, this might be also a sign that the power
over policy-issuing and policy-alternating is centralized in the hand of the most influential
individual in Russia: the president, Vladimir Putin.
According to Figure 11, in 2016, 74% of Russian elites had already perceived that the
President had the strongest power in influencing foreign polices. This proportion leveled up to
98% of elites believing that the President has the utmost power over foreign policies in 2020.
The next two groups which Russian elites perceived to have extreme influences over foreign
policies are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, which logically makes
sense because these two ministries are directly in charge of foreign affairs. Interestingly, in 2020,
the survey found out that 69% of elites think that the FSB has utmost power over foreign
policies, and 58% of Russian elites think that the Prime Minister has such power in issuing or
altering foreign policies. Even though the evidence is not yet concrete, my findings from the
survey suggest that the policy-making process is dependent upon very specific individuals (in
Russia, the President and the Prime Minister have such power and Putin had held both of those
positions in the past) and specific ministries or legislative branch directly involved in the
policy-issue. And since policy decisions are eventually dependent on only certain legislative
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elites, it is only logical that the policy decisions are uncertain and contingent to the benefits of
incumbents working in related fields.
Concluding Discussions
The research process on uncertainty in authoritarian regimes has pointed out that existing
literature is not focusing political succession as a sign of political uncertainty and that there is
little evidence to show the level of uncertainty in policy-related issues in such nations. My
findings have confirmed the hypothesis that there exist uncertainty in authoritarian regimes and
they exist in either the form of political succession or electoral-guaranteeing institutions. In fact,
such findings suggest that the electoral process itself is creating doubt and confusion that result
in electoral uncertainty. Such uncertainty might eventually lead to the destabilization of Russian
politics and Russia, despite Putin’s effort in maintaining stability. The report has also shown that
in Russia, there shows to be uncertainty in policy-related decisions because policies are decided
by only certain top-level authoritarian politicians. With such answers from the Survey of Russian
Elites, researchers in the field would be inspired to go to the next level in their empirical work to
create a concrete case in testing the aforementioned hypotheses about uncertainty in authoritarian
regimes.
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Table 1. Differences in Elite Perceptions of a Danger of Political Succession Between Party
and Non-party Members
1. No
danger
D5. Are you a
member of a
political party
or movement?

3

4 5.
Greatest
danger

Difficult to Refuse Total
answer (DO d
NOT
READ)
3
1
0
80

Yes

10

29

26

11

No

12

25

31

34

37

8

3

150

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

4

7

2

1

0

0

14

22

58

65

47

41

9

3

245

Difficult to
Answer
Refused
Total

2

Source: Data from Survey of Russian Elites, 1993-2016, 2020

